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* A less elaborate and much shorter German version of this paper was presented
at the annual meeting of the German Society for Ancient Philosophy (GanPh) at Bonn
University in May 2002. It was the scope of this Bonn talk to sum up and to defend
before a specialised group of predominantly German-speaking scholars one of the main
tenets I put forward in my recently published ‘Habilitation’ Unde Malum (Würzburg
2002), namely a proposed solution to the vexing and long contested problem of mat-
ter and evil in Plotinus (and before that, in an earlier essay version focussing on the
problem of evil’s threats to monism in Das Dilemma der Neuplatonischen Theodizee:
Versuch einer Lösung, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2000), pp. 1-35).
Both before and (especially) after the GanPh meeting, I was asked to make my argu-
ment known to a larger non German-speaking public in English by a number of schol-
ars (among them, Denis O’Brien, to whose publications on Plotinus my interpretation
is much indebted). As I return to the issue of matter and evil in the Enneads for the
third time, I seize the opportunity to expand and to systemise my argument in some
aspects, to rewrite several admittedly ambiguous passages and to include two or three
additional points which I mainly owe to the interesting discussion at the Bonn meet-
ing. I also want to thank Jake Mackey of Princeton University’s Classics Department
for correcting this paper and for his valuable comments and suggestions.
Matter in Plotinus’s Normative Ontology*
CHRISTIAN SCHÄFER
ABSTRACT
To most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and
evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. I.8[51] that ‘last matter’ is ‘evil’, and even ‘evil
itself’. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have
thought of matter, the sense-making ¶sxaton of his derivational ontology from
the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus’s tenets should nei-
ther accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task
of interpreting Plotinus’s texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the
whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an
incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that nei-
ther soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls mat-
ter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter’s totally passive potentiality
as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so
often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to ‘matter per se’
(for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and noth-
ing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melan-
choly evening sky is melancholy – not in itself (for it isn’t), but as to its
impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become
clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the aÈtÚ kakÒn as a prima
facie-reading of Enn. I.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the aÈtÚ kakÒn,
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1 It is my understanding that the English ‘evil’, not unlike the German ‘böse’, has
a more intensive meaning as compared to ‘bad’, ‘negative’, and similar terms. What
F.-P. Hager states for the German ‘böse’ should therefore hold for the English equiv-
alent ‘evil’ as well: namely that by its use „die religiöse und metaphysische Tiefen-
dimension besser angesprochen zu sein scheint, welche dem Begriffe des kakÒn gerade
in der Erörterung durch griechische Metaphysiker zukommt“ (F.-P. Hager, Gott und
das Böse im antiken Platonismus (Würzburg 1987), p. 10).
far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics
of Plotinus’s philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable
flaw-pattern for all the single kakã (hence the Platonic aÈtÒ). To conclude, I
shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus’s
teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doc-
trine of evil.
H.: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost 
in shape of a camel?
P.: By th’ mass and ’tis – like a camel indeed.
H.: Methinks it is like a weasel.
P.: It is backed like a weasel.
H.: Or like a whale.
P.: Very like a whale.
Hamlet III 2
It is the scope of this paper to reassess, and to answer, if possible, one
scandalous and much fought over question of Plotinus studies: is matter
in the Enneads to be identified with ‘evil’? I shall come back to Plotinus’s
concept (if not ‘definition’) of matter shortly. For starters, it is above all
the meaning of ‘evil’ that must be determined: for there is no modern
European language equivalent, to my knowledge, of the Greek word
kakÒn. Whatever is conceived of as bad, evil, wicked, base, vile, calami-
tous, foul, or negative in any way, can be expressed by this word, as the
dictionaries show. Whenever I employ in the following the English ‘evil’
as a conventional umbrella term of the philosophical idiom1 in order to
translate the broad-sensed Greek kakÒn, one thing should be clear: in the
Neoplatonic context I am going to treat, kakÒw or ‘evil’ is meant to denote
whatever is not in order with the world in single aspects or as a whole,
or, more ‘Platonically’ speaking: kakÒw is whatever can be adduced as
responsible for the fact that the world falls short in so many aspects of
the perfection one would expect it to have considering its single and
utterly good ontological origin.
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1. The problem and its sources
In contrast to so many other urgent philosophical questions, the Neoplatonists
were not able to securely mark out a coherent doctrine of evil in Plato.
The ‘material’ they were faced with was one of scattered ad hoc utter-
ances difficult to combine. To name just the most prominent examples:
– In Resp 611c, the s≈matow koinvn¤a is held to be the first of evils for
man (which could be swiftly combined with other passages like Phaedo
67d); in other dialogues as well, Plato seems to suggest that the svma-
toeid°w is the residuum of evils in other dialogues as well.
– In the Theaetetus (176a), the kakÒn is insinuated to be the ‘necessary’
corollary of what is good in the constitution of bodily things.
– On the other hand, in Parmenides 130b-d, the possibility of an idea or
of an ontological ‘type’ (in the sense of an absolute e‰dow) of what is
bad or evil, of an absolute evil, seems to be rejected considering the
timÆ and the presbe¤a of ideas: there are no ideas of étimÒtata and
faulÒtata.
– From Resp 353 et passim, we gather the argumentum e gradibus: ‘bad’
or ‘evil’, kakÒn, would be equivalent, according to this conception, to
the fact of a thing’s falling short of the standards established by its
ontological pattern. ‘Bad’ is such a thing as does not meet the expec-
tation of realising its form, its e‰dow, to its best, mãlista t°leon.
– Finally, in Laws 896/7, Plato seems to toy with the (at least) hypothe-
sis of a kakØ cuxÆ opposing the ér¤sth cuxÆ in the creation of the
world – a motif (perhaps all too) easily transferable to the image of the
soul-chariot in the Phaedrus (247b).
All of which is obviously meant to work under the unquestioned prin-
ciple that the Divine is not to be held guilty of evil(s), since it is entirely
good and, as such, t«n kak«n éna¤tion (Resp 379b).
Thus, to Plotinus, who claims to give a coherent account and a unified
view of Plato’s philosophy (Enn. V.1[10].8,10-14), the problem of evil
presented itself in the following manner: evil is a deficit in the earthly
realisation of normative standards, the deficit being due to the corporeal
constitution of things and/or to a certain fault of the soul. Roughly speak-
ing, a Neoplatonic answer, on these premises, would face two possibili-
ties: [1] to blame evil on a fault of the soul (being the form-giver of the
bodily cosmos, the communicator of normative standards onto earth), or
[2] to link up evil with the material condition of things, and ultimately
with matter itself.
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2 Cf. Dominic J. O’Meara, Das Böse bei Plotin, in: B. Mojsisch/T. Kobusch (eds.):
Platon in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte, pp. 33-47; Jan Opsomer, Proclus vs
Plotinus on Matter (De mal. Subs. 30-7), Phronesis 46 (2001), pp. 154-188.
3 Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus (Oxford 1993), p. 86.
In the face of the difficulty of reconciling these alternatives, interpreters
of Plotinus have always been tempted to opt for one of the two possibil-
ities, developing their theories at the expense of the other one. Most schol-
ars2 share a view according to which Plotinus, in his old age, dismissed
his earlier theory of the soul-flaw, and by the time he wrote Enn. I.8[51]
had totally adopted the explanation of evil as matter. The problem with
this thesis is this: if matter is identified with evil (and even evil ‘itself’),
that either “brings us back to the paradox that Good makes evil”3 (which
contradicts the Platonic dogma of the égayÚn kak«n éna¤tion), or it will
lead us to admit the subreptive assumption of a dualism of principles –
stemming from Middle-Platonism or elsewhere – in Plotinus’s thought.
The latter, however, contradicts the fundamental monistic key-note and
creed of his philosophy as a whole, as well as the explicit anti-dualist
statements to be found – not only! – in Enn. II.9[33].
In contrast, a relatively small (but obviously growing) number of inter-
preters has tried to blame evil in the Enneads on a metaphysical fault or
flaw, on the ‘fall’ or ‘debasement’ of a world-forming spiritual entity –
which, in Plotinus’s philosophical ‘system’ (and in accordance with the
motifs in Plato’s Laws and Phaedrus), would have to be the ‘soul’. But
how could that be, if Plotinus excludes every kind of evil from the realm
of the intelligible the soul inhabits (explicitly in Enn. I.8[51].2,25ff and
ch. 4-5)?
In addition, a conflict of congruency seems to arise when one takes 
seriously Plotinus’s position that the visible universe as a whole and the
soul as pertaining to the realm of the intelligible are to be considered as
good (Enn. IV.8[6].2,1-55), but that the necessary coming together of soul
and matter must be thought of as the beginning of evils due to a ‘sin’
(èmart¤a) of the soul (5,6).
But, as I shall try to show in what follows, there is a way to combine
and reconcile both of these possibilities by proving them to be comple-
mentary in a consistent theory of evil as Plotinus conceived it.
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4 For the sake of brevity, I describe simultaneous or non-temporal logical depen-
dencies in terms of chronology (in the same way, I describe non-spatial entities in
terms of ‘above’ and ‘inferior’ etc.). In ‘reality’, time is brought forth only at the last
stage of the procession, i.e. in the formation of the visible cosmos, as Plotinus reminds
us every now and then: cf. Enn. III.7[45].12,22; 13,23ff; Enn. II.4[12].5,25f. Note
Salustios’s words (De dis et mundo IV 9): “Now these things never happened, but
always are. And mind sees all things at once, but reason (or speech) expresses some
first and others after.”
5 This is a significant point: it is not the bare and dull fact or circumstance of being
2. Matter, soul, and the diffusio boni
A short glimpse of both candidates – soul and matter – will be necessary:
in his typical top-down-arrangement of reality generated through the onto-
logical ‘flux’ coming from the one and ineffable Origin, there is one
repeated pattern that Plotinus offers as an explanation (or sometimes rather
as a description) of how one ontological level is derived from the other
(that is, of what is frequently labelled ‘emanation’). According to this
explanation, a superior reality of higher ontological intensity generates a
hypokeimenon, an at first completely amorphous ontological substrate
meant to serve as an undetermined outlet for the further extension of being
coming from ‘above’. It is only by a ‘posterior’4 taking shape of its own
identity (in a participation in forms) that the emanate becomes another,
ontologically lower-ranging, but nevertheless well defined degree of being,
a grade of reality resembling its superordinate generating reality on a
lesser level. The amorphous hypokeimenon is what Plotinus calls matter,
Ïlh. In this sense, the soul(-level), too, when first brought forth by the
Nous, is to be considered as such an amorphous substrate and as an undefined
potentiality, as ‘matter’ in regard (or as compared) to the already onto-
logically defined generating reality, as Ïlh prÚw noËn, as Plotinus says in
an astounding passage of Enn. III.9[13].11,3/V.3. Soul becomes a reality
of its own and in itself only when exercising its proper activity in imita-
tion of and self-identifying (so to speak) distinction from the Nous.
Now the hypokeimenon brought forth by the soul-level in preparation
of soul’s own onto-generative activity (in imitation of the Nous), is the
sort of matter one could compare in a way to Aristotle’s prime matter.
This – as Plotinus insists – ‘inferior matter’ is what we ex post identify
as the (‘in itself’) structureless ‘fabric’, which underlies material-matter as
we know it of the bodily universe. And it is only this soul-dependant infe-
rior matter which will play a role in the following considerations con-
cerning evil.5
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matter, i.e. of subsisting as a structureless hypokeimenon, that raises the question of
matter and evil. The hypokeimenon of the ontogenetic activity of Nous is a structure-
less substrate too, but it remains aloof from all evil (cf. Enn. V.9[5].3,22ff; Enn.
II.4[12].3,4; Enn. III.9[13].5,2; Enn. II.5[25].3,14). Something else, some additional
problem, must be adduced if the ‘inferior matter’, the hypokeimenon of the soul’s activ-
ity, is going to be said to have anything to do with evil(s).
6 The nohtÒn is not confined, of course, to the Nous, but denotes all levels of real-
ity which are not corporeal, including soul as the last degree of the intelligible thus
conceived. In fact, the whole of chapter 8 of Enn. II.9[33], from which this quote is
taken, is dedicated to the soul.
7 Enn. II.9[33].8,21ff. Throughout this article, translations from the Enneads and
from Porphyry’s Vita Plotini are (with slight modifications) those of Armstrong.
Explanations and insertions in square brackets are mine.
8 Cf., among others, Enn. II.5[25].1,30f; III.4[15].1,6ff; IV.8[6].4,1ff (all of which
deal with the concept of ‘matter’). For some good explanations of this feature of Plotinus’s
philosophy see Jens Halfwassen, Aufstieg zum Einen (Stuttgart 1992), pp. 130-135;
Hans Buchner, Plotins Möglichkeitslehre (München 1970), p. 72; and John M. Rist,
Plotinus, The Road to Reality (Cambridge 1967), p. 123.
What is important is this: in Plotinus, soul and matter are to be defined
as standing in a complementary relationship to one another within the
dynamics of the diffusion of good and being: namely matter as the
hypokeimenon of soul’s self-identifying activity.
Soul, therefore, definitely does right and acts well and according to
Good (which it ultimately stems from and will have to revert to) when in
imitation and prolongation of what Nous does, it enables the diffusio boni
by bringing forth a hypokeimenon meant to serve as a necessary substrate
for a subsequent level of reality. For
the intelligible (tÚ nohtÒn)6 could not be the last [sc. level of being], for it had
to have a double activity, one in itself [§n •aut“, i.e. the self-identifying activ-
ity] and one directed to something else [efiw êllo, i.e. the passing on of being to
another]. There had, then, to be something after it, for only that which is the
most powerless of all things (t«n pãntvn édunat≈tatvn) has nothing below it.7
The dialectics of a double activity, §n°rgeia, towards itself and towards
the next lower level is a recurring thought in Plotinus:8 every new onto-
logical ‘product’ has to ‘gather itself’ at first, so as to constitute its own
identity out of the ontological fluxus which brought it forth as an undif-
ferentiated potentiality, as Ïlh. It is only then that it can turn to its own
ontologically generative activity (the different levels a water-fountain suc-
cessively fills are a handy and often used illustration of this double aspect
of ‘emanation’ and of how to understand it: only when the upper basin
nearest to the water-source is completely filled up with water, will it overflow
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9 In his La matière chez Plotin, Phronesis 44 (1999), pp. 45-71, Denis O’Brien has
examined this process of self-identification and reversion by interpreting several of the
most cogent passages of Plotinus’s works, such as Enn. V.1[10].7,4-6 (on p. 48f) and
Enn. V.2[11].1,7-11 (on p. 51ff). For a handy summary of this article, one sentence
taken from the English abstract will do good service: “The One or Intellect produces
an undifferentiated other, which becomes Intellect or soul by itself turning towards and
looking towards the prior principle, with no possibility of the One’s ‘turning towards’
or ‘seeing’ itself”.
10 In this interpretation I follow Denis O’Brien, La matière chez Plotin, p. 69.
to thus fill up the one beneath, and so on). For in its self-identification,
every reality recognises its origin, and in attaining awareness of its first
Origin, it recognises itself as a lesser image of this Origin, of Its utter
One-ness (in the act of turning to itself, in the §n°rgeia §n •aut“) as well
as of Its perfect undiminished radiation of being (in turning its activity
onto another, in its §n°rgeia efiw êllo).9 In Enn. II.4[12].5,32ff, too,
Plotinus explicitly lingers over the question of how everything produced
by the undifferentiated flow of being obtains its proper definition by revert-
ing towards the O/one it (ultimately) comes from (˜tan prÚw aÈtÚ §pis-
trafª). This is how every ontological level produces an ontologically
lesser ‘alter ego’, an êllo of itself (cf. Enn. V.2[11].1,9f: aÈtoË pepo¤hken
êllo ktl.).10
3. What evil is made of
As long as this – roughly sketched – process develops without any imped-
iment, everything will be in order. And it is: for this is exactly what
Plotinus states of the realm of the intelligible. In the level of reality sub-
sequent to the last degree of intelligible life, that is, to what ontologically
follows the soul, however, this process seems to have been seriously inter-
fered with in some way. It is by that ‘interference’ or ‘damage’ that what
is negative comes into our bodily universe. And it is by that circumstance
that the ‘whence’ of evil(s) is to be sought and can be found.
What I would like to show now is that this cacogenic damage has to
do with the hypokeimenon of soul’s activity, namely matter – and at the
same time that matter cannot be simply identified with evil ‘itself’ merely
for that reason. Strictly speaking, matter is just the last possible degree of
the derivation sequence from the One. As the passage from Enn. II.9[33]
quoted above shows, soul’s activity produces something which lacks any
proper §n°rgeia or ‘actuality’ and which therefore lacks any ability to
identify itself ontologically by ‘reversion’ or by steadying itself as an
Phronesis 143_266-294  11/18/04  1:30 PM  Page 272
MATTER IN PLOTINUS’S NORMATIVE ONTOLOGY 273
11 A differentiation in terminology is necessary at this point: Plotinus marks a clear
difference between the cuxØ t«n pãntvn and the individual soul, insisting at the 
same time that the universal Soul remains entirely unaffected with evil(s) (Enn.
I.8[51].15,23ff; Enn. IV.8[6].2,1-55) since both transmit being, but on different levels
and in slightly different ways. In the following, whenever I refer to ‘(the) soul’, the
individually acting spiritual entity is meant, except where Soul is put in upper case
(in such occasions as would allow of speaking of Soul and soul likewise – as is the
case of producing matter as its ßteron – I will simply concentrate on what individual
soul does, as the rest of the argument will rely on soul’s activity). For the nonethe-
less intimate relation of soul(s) to Soul – a relation not always easy to disentangle –
I remind the reader of Enn. IV.8[6].3,19-22. 
12 Cf., among others, the passage at Enn. I.8[51].3,7ff: mØ ¯n d¢ oÎti tÚ pantel«w
mØ ¯n éllÉ ßteron mÒnon toË ˆntow ktl. As such, matter is “like an image of being
or something still more non-existent” (ibid.). 
entity in its own right vis-à-vis the ontological flux. As soul11 transmits
the stream of being, it does not produce an êllo, an ontological reflection
or ‘alter ego’ of itself, but an ontological opponent or contrary (so to
speak), a negation of its energetic self, namely the t«n pãntvn édunat≈-
tatvn, which is matter. Matter, considered in this way, is not an êllo of
the producing soul, but rather a ßteron.
Interpreted according to the purport of the Platonic Sophistes, Plotinus
considers this ontological ßteron to be ultimately mØ ˆn,12 a last deriva-
tive not to be conceived of as ’something’ anymore, but merely as an
ontological ‘chasm’. Necessarily, this last, ‘meontic’ degree signifies the
total ebbing away or stoppage of the energetic process of successive self-
defining levels of being, and the necessary end of that process: hence the
statement in Enn. II.9[33].8,21ff that only and finally that ‘which is the
most powerless of all things has nothing below it’ – this might be an allu-
sion to the necessity-formula of Theaetetus 176a as well as a reminder of
Plotinus’s constant rapprochement (if not identification) of §n°rgeia and
oÈs¤a. So the expiration of all actuality in the ßteron-level opposite the
intelligible hypostaseis signifies the end of the derivation process. This is
what matter is, and this is what it should be considered as: the (though
ontologically slippery, rather ‘meontic’) final product of a dynamic
process it concludes, it depends on, and in turn affects.
Along the same lines, Plotinus metaphorically (oÂon) speaks of matter
as ‘begging’, ‘bothering’ or (as Plotinus’s choice of words might suggest)
‘instigating’ soul for the communication of form and for the transforma-
tion of its (sc. matter’s) unfitness into reality: and when Plotinus explic-
itly speaks of how matter by this constant begging and bothering and as
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13 I am sure, at any rate, that those interpreters are wrong who (like Venanz
Schubert, Pronoia und Logos (Salzburg/München 1968), p. 83, just to name one exam-
ple) believe that by saying this, Plotinus wilfully places a last paradox at the very bot-
tom of the problem of evil. There is no such paradox, or at least there is a solution
to the question that is not paradoxical, as I argue below.
14 The entire quote Enn. VI.7[38].28,7ff runs like this: éllå tÚ kakÚn p«w ¶fesin
ßjei toË égayoË; µ oÈd¢ t∞n Ïlhn §n §f°sei §tiy°meya, éllÉ ÍpÒyesin §poie›to ı
“matter’s indefiniteness distresses it” (cf. Enn. II.4[12].10,34) becomes soul’s
evil (Enn. I.8[51].14,35ff), then it should be clear that this statement
should, or rather must be read and can only be understood clearly within
the complementary context of soul’s activity in the diffusion of being. As
a matter of fact, the perspective Plotinus adopts is plain enough: he speaks
exclusively from the soul’s point of view on matter, telling how soul feels
bothered by amorphous matter’s simultaneous greed and incapacity for
being.
It is a distinctive feature of this construction that matter displays an
unexpected tendency towards good (which is form-giving) in its power-
less ‘will’ for realisation and for transformation into being, and in its
‘yearning for substance’ (Enn. III.6[26].7,13: Ípostãsevw ¶fesiw): matter
wants to, yet cannot, imitate the higher hypostaseis’ self-defining rever-
sal. Matter thus strangely partakes (if only in its own awkward way,
namely ex negativo) in the principle of the bonum diffusivum sui all
Neoplatonic derivation rests upon. One should stop to think about the far-
reaching implications and the serious consequences this Plotinian doctrine
has: the very matter denounced as ‘evil’ and ‘evil itself’, by its ‘nature’
has an inward connection with and a laudable tendency towards Good and
a (admittedly passive) role in the transmission of being, in the diffusio
boni. How is this to be understood, and what has all this, as the quoted
passages of the Enneads suggest, to do with evil(s) coming into the
world?13
Plotinus gives a hint in ch. 28 of Enn. VI.7[38]. – Actually, Plotinus’s
argument is quite revealing; what makes it look like a mere ‘hint’ is the
at first sight awkward example he embellishes his thoughts with. What
Plotinus says here is, I am convinced, the following: what makes us talk
of evil as equivalent to matter is the fact that amorphous matter, in its
powerlessness, begs and bothers soul for the communication of form. But
at the same time, matter is not able in any way to receive and to hold 
and contain form. Rather, and this is where the flowery language might
startle the reader, forms “come upon matter like a good dream (Àsper
Ùne¤ratow égayoË)” that seems to bring some order into it.14
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lÒgow a‡syhsin doÊw, e‡per oÂÒn te ∑n doËnai Ólhn throËsin: éllå toË e‡douw
§pelyÒntow, Àsper Ùne¤ratow égayoË, §n kall¤oni tãjei gegon°nai. The strange fact
that evil arises from something which is not active, but nonetheless ‘begs’ (noxious)
action, is illustrated for example, I should like to think, in the Odyssey when Homer
declares that “iron of itself draws a man to it” (XIX 13). Which means: wherever
weapons (which ‘iron’ metonymically stands for) are, men will engage in bloodshed
sooner or later. As in Plotinus’s account of matter, one may ask: what exactly is iron’s
‘evil’ here, iron’s negative afit¤a? It is the mere fact of ‘being there’ or ‘being at
hand’, and of serving in some way as a passive stimulus for some certain (and in this
case deplorable) action of an active principle.
What could this obscure image of the unreal pseudo-formation of mat-
ter as if by the approach of a ‘good dream’ possibly mean? Plotinus once
more seems to be “abounding more in ideas than in words” (noÆmasi
pleonãzvn µ l°jesi): a general stylistic feature of his, as Porphyry (Vita
Plotini 14,2) tells us. I attempt to render the main idea clearer by explain-
ing the illustrative image of the dream by still another illustrative image,
which I believe to be not only clarifying to a certain extent, but also ser-
viceable for illustrating the further development of the argument where
necessary. It was Leonardo da Vinci who said that to be an artist, it should
suffice to copy with a pencil whatever shapes or contours one gathers from
drifting clouds or from the cracks or uneven surfaces of a wall: faces, ani-
mal shapes, landscapes, in short: an entire universe of countless forms and
figures.
Now in reality, neither the fissures of a wall nor cumulus clouds or their
shadow-play actually have the shape of human faces or animal bodies etc.:
rather, it is the observer’s mind which, let leisurely loose for daydream-
ing, begins to shape the unstructured objects according to those structures
it knows from the real world and is concerned or accustomed to deal with
in real life. It is basically the psychological foundation of the Rorschach
method. It is an act of shaping from the observer’s side that does not reach
the object which, nonetheless, gave the occasion (or the substrate) for the
shape-giving daydream. When Plotinus speaks of form coming upon mat-
ter like a ‘good dream’, seemingly bringing structure to the ‘downright
structureless’, he is speaking, I would suggest, of a similar situation. And
he explicitly says so in another passage (Enn. III.6[26].7,32f): forms seem
to act upon matter, but do not achieve anything with it, “as if someone
in a way projected shapes in the void (§n t“ [. . .] ken“ morfåw efisp°m-
poi)”. In the same line, Enn. III.6[26].7,21ff reminds us:
whatever announcement it [matter] makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears
great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of
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15 Of course, and this should perhaps have been said earlier, clouds are not com-
pletely structureless (as Plotinian matter is). So it is understandable that we dream
forms into them when seeing their diffuse quasi-shape. – But what does soul see in
the totally amorphous hypokeimenon of matter? Itself, as in a mirror, Plotinus replies
(Enn. IV.3[27].12). Soul ultimately dreams itself into matter, thus disavowing its con-
tact with reality (which is spiritual). This, however, is a problem on the soul’s side,
to which I shall come back in the last paragraph of the summary to this paper.
16 In the passage from Hamlet quoted at the beginning of this article, Polonius’s
consent to see any animal the prince proposes in the shape of a wandering cloud is
mere fawning toadyism. But the transitory nature of shapes seen in a cloud is a handy
parallel of the transitory character of the bodily universe’s objects and shapes. In con-
trast to the intelligible’s, which always stay the same.
17 Cf. the motif of ‘awakening’ in Plotinus, who uses it to describe the re-entry
from such daydreams to the ‘real reality’ of the intelligible. As A.H. Armstrong has
put it in his chapter on Plotinus in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early
Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1967), p. 227: “Plotinus often describes this turning
and concentration of attention upwards as ‘waking’: and waking ourselves up from
our dream-like obsession with the needs and desires of our lower self in the world of
the senses is for him a difficult process requiring vigorous intellectual and moral self-
discipline”.
18 Cf. O’Brien, La matière chez Plotin, p. 45: “Since matter is lifeless, it cannot
fleeting frivolity (oÂon pa¤gnion feËgnon); hence the things which seem to come
to be in it are frivolities, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in
a mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another, etc.
Soul indulges in the idle dream of transferring forms onto amorphous 
matter, taking them from the intelligible realm and ‘more real reality’ 
soul pertains to and basically stays in forever.15 Yet this process of shap-
ing the amorphous remains entirely on the soul’s side and does not reach
matter nor have an effect on it, just as our daydreams, which remain 
solely in our minds, do not objectively bring clouds into shape.16 This
awkward situation made Plotinus observe that due to the formlessness 
of matter, objects appear to be where they in reality are not (Enn. III.6[26].7,4-
44)17 – because in reality the forms remain within the soul. Plotinus 
presents us here with a strange hylemorphistic negation of hylemorphism
– but a fitting piece of his philosophy entirely in accord with his funda-
mental ideas and basic conceptions, let alone his eagerness to interpret
Plato flawlessly. And of a piece with Plotinus’s theory of evil, too, as I
want to outline in the following. Because matter’s complete incapability
of form-reception and inaccessibility for structure, as well as soul’s com-
plementary drifting away in daydreams when making this inert matter the
object of its natural tendency of the ‘transmission’ of forms18 will show
the way to a better solution of the matter-evil problem.
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turn towards its source. Soul therefore has to be herself directly responsible both for
the production of matter and for the covering of matter with form”.
19 It is true that, as I said in the beginning, the Greek kakÒn has the meaning of
‘base’ or ‘incapable’ etc., too. But that would never justify the identification of the
‘base’ and ‘unfit’ with ‘evil itself’. Moreover, it is important to avoid the mistake of
calling a thing ‘bad’ just because there are others that are better. Augustine has a good
observation of this, as he asks in Ad Simplicianum I 2,8: Quo enim merito sol factus
est sol, aut quid offendit luna ut tanta illo inferior, vel quid promeruit ut sideribus
ceteris tanto clarior crearetur? Sed haec omnia bona creata sunt quaeque in genere
suo. 
4. Evil arising
So far, matter’s relation to soul (and vice versa) has been discussed. At
least two things should be clear by now.
First: although Plotinus speaks of matter as inert, structureless, power-
less, and obnoxiously incapable, etc., this does not render matter ipso facto
evil.19 The édunat≈tatvn t«n pãntvn is a necessary, as to ‘place’ and
‘function’ in its own way fitting (though admittedly unfit), and appropri-
ate constituent of reality as a whole. It has its proper place and sense
within this derivation process and to consider it outside of this process is
impossible and methodologically doubtful. Matter qua passive potential-
ity is nothing in itself but all-dependent on others. ‘Matter itself’ is an
oxymoron, to a certain extent, for Plotinus, and always to be referred to
as if written in quotation marks, and this should duly arouse suspicions
whenever a trite identification of matter and ‘evil itself’ is proposed.
Second: matter does not always (and therefore all talk of ‘per se’ or
‘by its nature’ etc. is rendered obsolete) instigate soul to perform an inad-
equate waste of form-transmission on its amorphous hypokeimenon. From
case to case, soul profitably and agreeably ‘dreams’ forms into matter, and
the most prominent example of this achievement is the universe as a
whole, which like a living, perfect and beautiful work of art is an accom-
plished and joyful projection of forms by the world-Soul, the artifex
mundi, into matter (which is why Plato praises the cosmos as a ‘blessed
God’: Enn. IV.8[6].1-2; Enn. V.8[31].8,21; Enn. II.9[33].4,27; 8,19ff).
Plotinus reminds us of all that in the elaborate passage on Soul’s activity
in building the corporeal realm in Enn. IV.8[6].2,1-55. But individual
souls can contact matter without any harm done as well. They on princi-
ple are strong enough to perform their activity in matter without doing
wrong and without evil coming to pass: cf. Enn. I.8[51].425-28; Enn.
IV.7[2].13,9; Enn. III.2[47].4,10. Finally, the ‘visible gods’, i.e. the plan-
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20 All the same, in distinguishing the ‘two matters’, ‘lower’ and ‘upper’, Plotinus
solves a problem Plato left unanswered: whether matter has a good disposition for
receiving form (as in Timaeus 56c), or a negative inertness (as Politicus 273bc might
suggest, among other passages). Plotinus can answer this traditional dilemma: on prin-
ciple, matter (‘lower’ and ‘upper’) is a mere hypokeimenon and therefore by ‘essence’
disposed to receive form, as the Timaeus has it. Yet ‘lower’ matter displays an utter
inability to be formed and by its total passiveness is liable to overstrain its form-giving
principle, soul.
21 This is not a paradox, either. It just seems to be one to the modern reader. I have
tried to disentangle Plotinus’s doctrine of the ‘fallen soul’ and its èmart¤a in a pre-
vious article: Tragische Schuld im Theatrum Mundi Plotins, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte
40 (1998), pp. 33-56, and again in Unde Malum, pp. 69-104.
22 Matter is an afit¤a simply ‘by its presence’, Plotinus says in a fabulous passage
on soul’s relation to matter which ends like this: “soul would not have come to it
[matter, that is] unless its presence had given soul the occasion of coming to birth”
(Enn. I.8[51].14,54f ).
ets, are corporeal, hence material (Ïlhw paroÊshw), but are free of all evil
(tÚ kakÚn mØ pare›nai): Enn. I.8[51].5,31-35. So it is not by the mere
presence of matter that a presence of evil can be diagnosed, which makes
it difficult to believe that matter in Plotinus can be salva veritate com-
muted with evil. – In consequence, even ‘lower’ matter is not ipso facto
the carrier or bearer of evil, let alone evil itself, and therefore not per se
the cause for whatever is not in order with the world.20 And neither is the
form-bringing S/soul-principle, of course. And neither matter nor soul is
to be considered as evil in actu, since both do definitely serve the diffu-
sio boni.
Yet, evils come into the world exactly when both, soul and matter, get
in contact in the constitution of the bodily cosmos. It is, of course, the
formative principle of individual reality – and not the world-Soul – whose
activity upon matter is the problem here. Plotinus has given the question
of the (individual) soul’s ‘fall’ a great deal of thought. He speaks of soul’s
‘lapse’ and ‘mistake’ (or should we venture to translate ‘sin’: èmart¤a?)
and ‘forgetfulness’ etc. But at the same time, he wants to maintain that
there is no evil in the realm of the intelligible. It takes another entire opus-
culum to explain this only prima facie inconsistency in Plotinus in detail.21
Yet, what has been said about matter so far, should help for an under-
standing of what happens here in respect to the origin of evil(s): in its
(anthropomorphically speaking:) ‘deplorable’ condition of complete 
powerlessness and formlessness, matter by merely being there (not by act-
ing on its own initiative)22 incites soul to act upon it, to ‘make something
out of it’, to follow its natural §n°rgeia efiw êllo. Matter ‘does’ nothing
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here, it is just what it was always meant to be: the hypokeimenon of soul’s
naturally defining activity.
In a sense, soul’s experience of and relation to matter is comparable to
our everyday experience of and relation the future. Our perception of the
future is that of a mere potentiality, a vast outlet for our prospective act-
ing, and nothing in itself; it is just what ‘we make of it’, but then again,
as soon as we take action ‘making the future’, the future is no more, it
ceases to be the future and as soon as it is realised, it becomes ‘some-
thing’ which is not the future anymore. All the same, the future ‘bothers
us’ and ‘begs’ for action, for being moulded and forged. The future, one
could say, is a ‘meontic’ pure openness of possibilities and as soon as this
openness is closed down to one possibility, reality comes to be. Still, the
future is not as ontologically slippery a concept as structureless matter in
Plotinus, as should be clear from what has been said so far about mat-
ter’s status. This is where the comparison lets us down.
In its utter incapacity for epistrophic self-identification matter needs to
be ontologically replenished, ‘reverted towards Good’, by another (as Plotinus
insists, for instance, in Enn. II.5[25].1,30f). This other is, of course, soul
as standing next to it in the sequence of the prÒodow of being. So what
happens is this: matter’s ‘insatiate poverty’ (Enn. I.8[51].3,13ff; Enn.
II.4[12].16,20 etc.), which puts it so to speak ¶jv t«n ˆntvn (Enn.
II.4[12].10,35) as long as forms do not come to it, does in fact ‘bother’
soul and lets soul assume the task matter cannot accomplish: to form and
to confer being to the structureless hypokeimenon. A futile task, as the
reader knows by now. Therefore it is (rather: it can be from case to case)
a mistake for the soul to turn its attention to matter, though a highly laud-
able mistake, since soul is devoted to the diffusio boni. Accordingly,
Plotinus can maintain his dogma of the utter goodness of the intelligible
realm and at the same time explain how and why it is that soul’s activ-
ity in the bodily sphere can have evil(s) as a consequence: it is because
soul’s entirely well motivated intentions of form-giving despair vis-à-vis
matter’s completely amorphous inability to be formed, to be ‘mastered by
form’ (Enn. I.8[51].5,24). This passive resistance to the communication of
form and the frustration of soul’s §n°rgeia efiw êllo it brings with it, make
it clear why matter is called ‘evil’ in the Enneads. But it should be equally
clear now that when Plotinus calls matter evil, this can only be meant
within a dynamic process it stands in, depending on and (passively) acting
on others. Finally, it should be clear that evils belong to the ontic world,
to the (according to Enn. VI.7[38].28) ‘oneiric’ realm of the strangely uncon-
summated encounter of soul and matter; what lies beneath them as ‘the’
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23 Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London 1994), p. 192 (my italics). This is exactly
what Plotinus says in Enn. I.8[51].9,16-18 (matter as opposed to form), and 9,26f (mat-
ter as tÚ aÈt“ [i.e. to noËw] §nant¤on).
24 This is what Plotinus says when defining the phenomenon of matter-evil in its
‘essence’ as a strictly relational term and therefore speaks of evil being “unmea-
suredness in relation to (prÒw) measure, and unboundedness in relation to limit, and
formlessness in relation to formative principle, and perpetual neediness in relation to
what is self-sufficient; always undefined, nowhere stable, subject to every sort of influence,
insatiate, complete poverty: and all this is not accidental to it but in a sort of way its
essence (‘oÈs¤a’)” (Enn. I.8[51].3,13-18).
25 W.R. Inge was right, therefore, to identify matter’s indefinable ‘fÊsiw’ (which
Plotinus mentions in Enn. I.8[51].6 et passim) as “resistance to form” (The Philosophy
of Plotinus, New York 31968, p. 134); John M. Rist, Plotinus on Matter and Evil,
Phronesis 6 (1961), pp. 154-166, is equally right in understanding the êpoiow Ïlh
(Enn. I.8[51].10,1f) and the §rm¤a of matter as the “non-cooperation of something
completely inert” as to the communication of form (p. 156). On the kakoË fÊsiw (Enn.
I.8[51].1,4) and the problems of defining evil as an oÈs¤a (which it strictly isn’t): 
Enn. I.8[51].3,22f; its status of being “as if (oÂon) an oÈs¤a” is alluded to in Enn.
I.8[51].3,17.
evil, however, does not necessarily have to be a fixed, or at least deter-
minable, ontological ‘item’ (to choose a term as vague as possible), as
soul and matter are, but rather has to be identified with an ontological
state of affairs, with a metaphysical dynamics of correct or incorrect
encounters and couplings of such ontological ‘items’ or ‘factors’, etc.
Lloyd P. Gerson was right, therefore, when he spoke up against the
facile identification of matter and evil to be found in most interpreters of
Plotinus: he straightens out the scholarly discussion by pointing out that
the kakÒn is not simply to be considered matter (sans phrase), but, and
this makes a big difference, “matter viewed in relation to form and
Good”.23 It is indeed the ever insatiable dependence of matter on form 
and Good which is the metaphysical pr«ton kakÒn, since ‘form’/‘shape’
means being, and, in turn, shapelessness is matter’s ‘fÊsiw’ or ‘oÈs¤a’, as
it were.24
Matter’s neediness and simultaneous incapacity for receiving form, its
‘relational oÈs¤a’, is the centre of Plotinus’s doctrine of evil.25 The receiv-
ing of being kayÉ ˜son dÊnatai (cf. Enn. II.9[33].3,1ff), which constituted
the different ontological intensities and well-defined degrees of being so
far, is lead ad absurdum in matter’s unlimited receptiveness which has no
measure kayÉ ˜son anymore.
Earlier I compared matter’s status to the status of the future as always
mere potentiality. There is another comparison to everyday experience of
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26 Once more O’Brien seems to have hit the nail on the head when he says: “Soul
will forever cover with form the formlessness and the disfigurement of the object
whose appearance is a consequence of her own movement away from the higher prin-
ciples ‘towards herself’ (cf. Enn. III.9[13].3,7-16). Not that the movement was itself
evil. The soul becomes evil, not in the making of matter, but only as a possible con-
sequence of her activity in covering with form the object to which she has given birth”
(Plotinus on Matter and Evil, in: Ll.P. Gerson (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus (Cambridge 1996), p. 190).
27 That st°rhsiw is meant to be an êrsiw, a ‘nullification’ or a ‘frustration’, can
easily be deduced from Enn. II.4[12].13,23ff (êrsiw går ≤ st°rhsiw, etc.). As to how
a ‘passive st°rhsiw’ can be conceived of, see, for example, Hubert Benz, Materie und
Wahrnehmung in der Philosophie Plotins (Würzburg 1990), p. 127.
potentiality I should like to adduce in order to show how potentiality can
be conceived of by us as noxious or even ‘evil’. It is Plato himself who
warns his readers that money as mere possibility can work disastrously
on humans. What he thinks of is, of course, the devastating effect money
(as compared to valuable ‘things’) can have on a man’s pleonej¤a, pre-
cisely because money is not an ‘object’: there are two constituents, one
wanting everything, the other allowing the acquisition of everything by in
itself being nothing, and this will go haywire. That matter is mere poten-
tiality without being something (at least, of any worth) ‘in itself’ might
be even more patent to us, whose money is no longer made of precious
metals, than to Plato’s contemporaries. Yet, normative assessment comes
in here more drastically: paper (or virtual) currency, being close to noth-
ing by itself, is mere possibility, and its ‘meontic’ status diminishes in the
measure that it is spent, or ‘realised’, turned into objects, etc. Yet, we
know perfectly well what those people mean who say that money has a
negative influence on people, and that money is ‘dangerous’, noxious, and
finally might be ‘bad’ because it is just open potentiality.
This is why matter is to be considered a privation, corruption, obstruc-
tion, and disturbance of soul’s – on principle – positive and laudable activ-
ity.26 This also explains the concept of evil as st°rhsiw by matter to be
found in Enn. I.8[51].11,1ff, among other loci: soul’s activity is rendered
futile and diminished by matter’s passive inertness, and it is as absurd and
futile as any of our attempts to shape cumulus clouds ‘in reality’ by think-
ing forms into them would be. This evil-qua-st°rhsiw definition, too,
exemplifies how evil by its ‘essence’ depends on the coming together of
two constituents, since ‘st°rhsiw’ has no reasonable significance in itself
and obtains its sense only when we include a defining relational ‘of what’
in its definition.27 Matter’s st°rhsiw or êrsiw to soul’s natural activity, its
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28 In Plotinus’s eyes the reversion of the upper emanate is at the same time the
reversion of the lower emanate it penetrates with being. The two energies he speaks
of in Enn. II.9[33].8,29ff thus complement each other in the reversion of all towards
the highest Being. There are frequent allusions to this idea that the higher reality con-
tains the lower one(s) and lifts it (them) up in its own upward movement throughout
the Enneads: Enn. IV.3[27].9,34ff; VI.9[9].3,3ff; VI.4[22].1,7; V.5[32].9,30.
29 By this explanation of how the metaphysical kakÒn is the pattern of ‘natural’
and moral kakã, I of course allude to the common classification of evils as estab-
lished by Leibniz (Essais de théodicée I §21). But still, one must beware: the modern
classification never can do justice to the ample concept of ‘evil’ in Neoplatonic phi-
losophy, and perhaps any good Neoplatonist would have rejected it. In this line, just
to mention one difficulty out of many, the term ‘natural evil’ is to be understood as a
façon de parler: evil is never natural to Plotinus, but strictly contra naturam.
30 I would never dare to construe such an imaginative example, if it were not for
Plotinus himself hinting at it over and over again: cf., for instance, Enn. VI.9[9].8,16ff;
IV.3[27].17,21ff; I.8[51].13,17f. The motif of the ‘bottomless’ waters of the utterly 
reduction of soul’s formative task to Sisyphean toil, results objectively in
‘natural evils’, the sufferings soul experiences when ordering the bodily
universe, i.e. pains, sicknesses, hunger, deformities, as well as ugliness
and other imperfections and troublesome hindrances and shortcomings of
all kinds, in short, the kakã we suffer (cf. Enn. IV.8[6].2,44ff; Enn.
V.9[5].10,4ff; Enn. I.8[51].5,23ff; et passim). The ‘subjective’ conse-
quences are to be found in soul’s further involvement in a mere mirror-
reality of imperfect form-dreams, an entanglement which paralyses and
hardens it, which dilutes its attention and turns it away from what it should
do (which is to revert towards Good and to live in the sphere of the intel-
ligible and the true forms)28 and perverts or darkens its perception of what
is real and right. This is what Plotinus understands by ‘moral evil(s)’, that
is sin, wickedness, and everything else which, as Plotinus fears, will drag
us deeper into the morass of ‘natural evils’: Enn. I.8[51].15,13-23; 5,20-
26; etc.29
It is as if soul spontaneously and without further reflection rushed into
a life-threatening situation with the commendable intention of helping a
drowning child crying for assistance, and as if this unselfish (or should
we say: self-forgetful?) deed almost led to both of them drowning, soul
not having been strong enough to keep both of them afloat. Nobody will
rightly reproach either of them for this: neither the drowning non-swim-
mer’s cry for help nor the would-be rescuer’s attempt to render aid can
be called evil. Evil as a consequence of the two of them coming together
in the difficult rescue has, if not positive, at least no negative, ‘evil’ or
‘bad’ premises.30
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different goes back to Plato (Politicus 273de). ‘Drowning’ is also the leitmotiv of the
frequent allusions Plotinus makes to the Narcissusmyth, comparing soul to the man
who wanted to get hold of his own image on the water, not considering it was only
a reflection, and drowning in the attempt – a myth whose illustrations can nicely be
brought into agreement and matched with what I said before about the dreaming of
forms onto matter: cf. Enn. I.6[1].8,6-15. Once more, I should like to draw the reader’s
attention to a quote from O’Brien, Plotinus on matter and evil, p. 190: “The soul’s
excessive absorption in caring for the things of this world has the tragic consequence
that the soul herself becomes evil, because of the nature of the object that she cares
for. The soul becomes evil when she does so, because the object of her care is ‘evil
itself’”. Note that from this point of view, O’Brien couldn’t help, just as I can’t,
putting the term ‘evil-itself’ in gnomic commas.
31 Enn. I.8[51].10,1f. When I say that evil cannot be defined as an ‘as such’ or ‘in
itself’, I share the same view of those who believe it to be prime evil sans phrase.
Cf. the remark made by O’Meara, Das Böse bei Plotin, p. 37: “Wir erkennen das Gute,
indem wir den determinierten vielfältigen Ausdruck des Guten im intelligiblen Sein
erfassen. So könnte auch das absolute Böse erkennbar werden, indem wir Gestaltungen
des Bösen im körperlichen Sein begreifen können”, and, on the following page: “Auch
kann ein Begriff [. . .] des absoluten Bösen entwickelt werden, indem man die Eigen-
schaften des Guten verneint”. – Note that O’Meara correctly recognises that just as
Good is only good insofar as it does good, evil is admitted to be evil only insofar as
it does evil. As ‘Good’ is beyond all good and therefore in itself not good but more-
than-good and more-than-being (as §p°keina t∞w oÈs¤aw), matter is not in itself evil,
but less-than-evil since it is ¶jv t«n ˆntvn, below the realm of all manifestation of
evil(s).
It is in an almost ‘tragic’ shift of circumstance that the interpreter learns
why, when speaking of the unending dynamics of ontological generation
and reversion, Plotinus calls matter evil: curiously, he does so for the same
reasons that would definitely forbid him to call matter ‘as such’ (if that
wasn’t an oxymoron) and in an impossible vision as disconnected from
the prÒodow, ‘evil (itself)’. As we contemplate matter for philosophical
investigation’s sake as if it were conceivable as something (with)in itself
(which it isn’t, since it never emerged as ‘in itself’ from the flux of being),
we seem indirectly to grasp a negative notion of it as not being, as mere
passive dÊnamiw, as ontologically void of reality etc., in short: as the very
pre-ontic substratum all matter is without ipso facto being evil. Matter ‘is
not’ in the sense that it is not yet, but ‘as such’ awaits being, which is
not being evil, leave alone evil in a sense so intensive as to speak of it
as ‘evil itself’ and all evils’ evil: êpoiow d¢ oÔsa p«w kakÆ, Plotinus is
right to ask.31 The answer he has to this question is revealing, since it
shows a) that evil is not to be considered as an entity, but as privation,
i.e. in relational terms; and that b) evil is therefore not a ÍpÒstasiw in
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32 Enn. I.8[51].10,13-11,4. As to why I hold the l°getai to indicate a ‘so-to-speak’,
cf. infra point 5. on Proclus and Plotinus, the concluding paragraph of this article.
33 This passage illustrating the dynamic coherence of the whole of Plotinus’s ontol-
ogy shows that I should clarify what I said in footnote 31: for whilst the One (or the
Good) can to a certain extent be treated as a hypostasis ‘in itself’, ‘isolating’ it, as it
were, argumenti causa from the context of the realities ‘after’ it – since all those
depend on it whereas it does not in any way depend on them – everything following
the One and Good in the prÒodow of being can only be grasped as inserted in the
dynamics of the progressive diffusion, and in relation to the preceding realities, which
in the most intensive case is true for matter as being totally ‘in relation to other(s)’
and nothing ‘in itself’.
itself, but merely co-exists §n êllƒ. Believe your eyes: Plotinus is saying
exactly what Proclus says when allegedly criticising Plotinus and when in
fact criticising the doctrine of matter’s identification with evil. Plotinus’s
wording comes as close to a parupÒstasiw-definition of evil as it possi-
bly can without using the term itself:
For it is not called (l°getai) evil because it has, but rather because it has not
quality; so that perhaps it would not be evil if it was a form (e‰dow) instead of
a nature opposed to form. But the nature opposed to form is privation; but pri-
vation is always in something else and has no existence by itself (d¢ ée‹ §n êllƒ
ka‹ §pÉ aÈt∞w oÈx ÍpÒstasiw).32
As we attempt to define matter ‘in itself’, we must at the same time admit
that we cannot. At least not if we take Plotinus’s philosophy seriously.
Speaking of matter as if it were something kayÉ aÍtÒ is dubious in the
Plotinian context, and if Plotinus himself does so, he has something else
specifically in mind, as I shall presently show (cf. below, step [5] in the
summary). Matter as mere potentiality is all-dependent on realisation
‘from above’, is ontologically all-‘awaiting’ and nothing else. Matter can
only be adequately grasped (if ever) when seen within the dynamics of
the ontological process whithin which it makes sense as the final con-
stituent. And the same is true for Plotinus’s doctrine of ‘matter as evil’:
the ‘other’, which matter awaits being from, is soul, and it is as a con-
stituent of the by nature interrelated prÒodow and return that matter can
become a lethal trap for its formative principle whose action it passively
provoked by just being at hand as a totally indeterminate substratum for
soul’s natural §n°rgeia efiw êllo. An §n°rgeia, on the other hand, which
was not meant to be wasted on an absurd losing of the soul’s self to the
mere ‘mirror’ of matter, but to be the energy of reversion towards the
higher truths and real forms.33
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34 To mention only one example of one of the major exponents of that shift in inter-
preting Plotinus: Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, Chicago/London
1993 (in the same line, the book review of Werner Beierwaltes in Gnomon 72 (2000),
pp. 202-207, is highly interesting). 
35 Dominic O’Meara, throughout his Plotinus, makes a strong point in favour of
adopting a perspective ex parte rerum recipientium (as Thomas Aquinas put it), and
correctly so. Consequently, he advocates the use of the term ‘derivation’ (which
describes the procession from a perspective quoad nos) in place of the traditional 
‘emanation’.
36 Two or three examples taken from Enn. I.8[51] may stand for all others: 7,12-
14; 14,38-455; in the latter passage in particular, matter is called ‘evil’ because
(to¤nun, êra . . .) it causes soul’s evils. The conclusion of the Ennead (15,13-29) is
entirely ’subjective’ in its ways of treating the problem and speaks from soul’s point
of view.
5. Sola sub nocte per umbras
There is one key-note to Plotinus’s treatises that should not be underesti-
mated: it is not in vain that recent scholarly works increasingly insist on
the predominance of the dynamics in Plotinus, on calling his philosophy
one of experience rather than a rigid ‘system’,34 on speaking of ontologi-
cal ‘derivation’ (i.e. quoad nos) rather than ‘objectively’ of ‘emanation’.35
Recent interpretation shows a strong tendency to more frequently recog-
nise the human subject as the centre of attention in Plotinus’s treatises,
and to consider the grand world-picture the Enneads draw as a reflection
of the intellect-gifted subject’s inner self.
As a consequence, Plotinus’s language is – almost paraenetically –
moulded to fit the soul’s point of view within the ‘system’ (what other
viewpoint should a human thinker adopt?), and to express adequately this
emphasis on the inner experience, on the objectively subjective.36 This
‘agent-relative’ point of view and form of expression (as opposed to an
‘agent-neutral’ one which, I insist, seems to be quite dubious if attributed
to Plotinus) explains Plotinus’s calling matter evil: as I tried to show, there
is no such thing as a ‘matter itself’ that is to be identified with ‘evil’.
When Plotinus speaks of evil matter and matter as evil, he does so by
adopting or even cleaving to soul’s point of view in performing its activ-
ity on matter, a point of view that does not permit the conclusion that
matter as evil means matter is evil, but that soul perceives matter qua evil,
and not before coming upon it. In a way, this resembles the Greek con-
cept of the élhy°w, which implies or presupposes an object ‘capable’ of
being grasped (of being é-lhyÆw) as corresponding to the subject capable
of grasping it. Plotinus might have something like this in mind in referring
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37 Let me be clear on this: I do not say that Plotinus’s speaking of matter as evil
is just a façon de parler like our referring to the evening sky as melancholy, which
is a variety of metonymical talk and therefore to be considered a (mere) rhetorical
device – telling as it may be. However, the allagé adiectivi can serve as an analogy
for the enallagé of thoughts or of viewpoints within a philosophical ’system’ we encounter
here and that I want to stress; more importantly, it can illustrate the shift from an
‘agent-neutral’ point of view and language all too readily presumed for the interpre-
tation of the Plotinian treatises to an ‘agent-relative’ point of view and form of expres-
sion in Plotinus’s account of evil and render it plausible (I apologise by the way for
usurping the ‘agent-’terminology which has ist own distinct place and meaning in the
contemporary moral and social philosophy where it originated).
to the truth of being and the problem of meontic evil in Enn. I.8[51].6,44-
47, as well as in calling (as he frequently does) matter an ‘ontological
lie’: cf. the passage Enn. II.6[26].7,21ff quoted above.
Matter qua evil or – in this ‘actual’ way of speaking – ‘evil matter’ is,
I want to suggest, to be taken as a methodical enallagé of thoughts (which
perhaps is a better word for it than ‘pathetic fallacy’): just as in the allagé
adiectivi we make use of without much ado and with great adequacy for
what we want to say, when we speak of the ‘melancholy evening sky’.
The evening sky is not melancholy, nor is it in any way capable of being
so. What we express here in a most natural turn of speech is the ‘quoad
nos’ of the evening sky, the (e)motion it evokes within us who are capa-
ble of melancholy, but which at the same time comes from within us, and
not from the contemplation of the evening sky – though we would most
probably not be affected by melancholy if it had not been for the evening
sky which just happened to be there and which met our eye and attention.
What makes the evening sky melancholy is what it stands for in soft or
crying colours: the end of the day, the termination of labours accom-
plished or not, things awaiting us tomorrow, etc.37
As I have tried to point out, there are good reasons for not trusting a
trite and all too heedless ‘wrongly objective’ identification of matter ‘per
se’ and evil ‘in itself’ in Plotinus. The severe contradictions, paradoxes,
and inconsistencies arising within the philosophy of Plotinus itself if such
an all too simplistic identification – which renders matter the salva veri-
tate substitute of evil – is admitted, are due not only to the astonishing
readiness of interpreters to let an ‘early Plotinus’ plainly contradict a ‘late
Plotinus’, or a self-confessed monist a latent dualist, etc. They are also an
effect of not perceiving that Plotinus’s thoroughly dynamic and ‘actual’
view on philosophy renders his language a less doctrinal and more expe-
rience-centred one than many ‘scholastic’ interpretations can grasp. I take
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38 As John Dillon has put it in his introduction to MacKenna’s translation of the
Enneads: “The entire system is assumed in each of the separate treatises, which mole
the form of special developments or demonstrations of significant points, not chapters
in one work of consecutive exposition” (Plotinus: The Enneads. Ed. J. Dillon, trans-
lated by S. MacKenna, Harmondsworth 1991, p. xxx).
39 Cf. Enn. I.8[51].6,58: ple›ston éllÆlvn kex≈ristai. And 6,41: §nant¤a tå
ple›ston éllÆlvn éfesthkÒta ktl. 
his – otherwise conceptually helpless – remarks on, or rather, as I feel
free to say now: ‘theory’ of evil to be a good example of this.38
I am quite aware of the fact that my interpretation seems to contradict
some Plotinian utterances to be found (especially) in ch. 13 of Enn.
I.8[51]. This is where Plotinus says that evil and evil’s effects should not
be separated from one another so as to possibly call one of them evil and
the other one not: Enn. I.8[51].13,2ff. At the same time, Plotinus insists
that by kak¤a he does not merely signify a simple §mpÒdion tª cuxª, an
impediment to the soul, but that the kak¤a presupposes an aÈtÚ kakÒn
which is its cause (13,4ff; cf. 14.50: kak¤aw afit¤a). I shall briefly try at
least to outline how my interpretation absorbs and integrates these – prima
facie considered – ‘threats’ to its main tenets.
First, my interpretation explicitly avoids what Plotinus holds to be an
interpretive mistake of his account of evil. For in the agent-relative inter-
pretation presented on the preceding pages, no division of being and effect
is proposed at all. On the contrary, ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ effect and
‘potential’ or ‘meontic’ being are taken to be necessarily the same in the
special case of evil. And this must have been Plotinus’s view as well, I
think, and very probably the reason for this warning: for mark that
Plotinus does otherwise identify matter and its privative effects downright,
and insists on matter being a depriving impediment to the soul’s activity
(taÈtÒn, he calls them in Enn. II.4[12].16,3; and the kakÒn is presented
as the matter of fact of privation in Enn. I.8[51].1,19: [tÚ kakÚn d¢] …w
st°rhsiw, just to mention two examples).
Perhaps one more observation in this context. Even in his attempt to
give a close-to-ontological definition of matter’s ‘otherness’, namely in
calling it the mØ oÈs¤a as opposed to the true oÈs¤a of the first Principles,
Plotinus cannot but make his point by referring – énaba¤nvn and kata-
ba¤nvn – to their “furthest possible separation from each other”39 within
the procession of being, and by clearly stating that Good and evil are
opposed to each other insofar as they are acting or act-inciting érxa¤ and
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40 This corresponds to the opening remarks on the Good in the same treatise. Here
too the Good is presented not as something ‘in itself’, but as the érxÆ, as “that on
which everything depends and to which all beings aspire; they have it as their princi-
ple and need it”, etc.: Enn. I.8[51]2,1-8, et passim. Note how evil is opposed to Good,
then: as that which entirely depends on others, which aspires to being, is not an onto-
logical principle at all, and is needy in every aspect. All these are strictly relative
classifications.
41 I am almost sure that there is much more to the pun §j éntiy°tvn sun°sthke
than just the meaning ‘being made up of opposites’. I fail to come up with a better
translation, but at least it should be clear that the expression cannot possibly refer to
the ontological ‘constitution’ of Good and evil as ‘assembled’ or ‘put together’ by
‘elements’ of heterogeneous origin, or the like.
42 Plotinus compares this to virtuous life which does not give an idea of the good
yet, but is its manifestation. Analogously, kak¤a is to be considered a manifestation
of the kakÒn: Enn. I.8[51].13,6f. But at the same time, he maintains that it is by enter-
ing the dynamics of the ontological scaling that virtue puts us on track for an under-
standing of the Good (cf. ibid.: épÚ t∞w éret∞w énaba¤nvn ktl.). And this is crucial:
the phenomenon subjacent to all manifestations is correctly understood by the ‘agent-
relative’ shift, solely énaba¤nvn and kataba¤nvn on the ontological scale, as the soul
does by nature, since it is “like an amphibian”, pertaining to the intelligible world, but
living, as it were, in the bodily realm, descending and ascending constantly: cf. Enn.
call forth opposite consequences (érxa‹ går êmfv, ≤ m¢n kak«n, ≤ d¢
égay«n: Enn. I.8[51].6,34):40
for (§pe¤per) their contrariety does not depend on quality or any other category
of being (g°now t«n ˆntvn), but on their furthest possible separation from each
other, and on their being made up of opposites41 and on their contrary action (tå
§nant¤a poie›): Enn. I.8[51].6,56-59 (my italics).
Second, what Plotinus wants to get at in Enn. I.8[51].13 is, and a more
detailed scrutiny of the text should be able to prove it, that the different
forms evil manifests itself in and which we perceive as evil(s) and might
be all too willing to declare to be ultimate evil(s) – since immediacy is a
mighty goddess, as a classicist friend of mine used to say –, are not evil
itself, but evils qua varieties of the manifestations of the one pr«ton
kakÒn. Plotinus simply states that the ‘multiform’ phenomena of evil(s)
are not to be mistaken for their ‘uniform’ cause, and that their analysis
and their understanding does not yet give an answer to what brought them
forth. In short: that in order to understand evil at its root, one must go
beyond the analysis of ‘physical’, ‘natural’, or ‘moral’ evil(s) and show
what their underlying ‘metaphysical’ evil is whose mere manifestation(s)
they are.42 Or think of the (pr«ton) kakÒn-kakã distinction as remotely
analogous to the famous concept-conception distinction in John Rawls’s
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IV.8.4,32. – It is thus that W.R. Inge called soul the “wanderer of the metaphysical
world” (The Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 203).
43 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge/Mass. 1971. On the concept-con-
ception distinction see section 9 of the book.
Theory of Justice:43 at least in the way that Rawls’s ‘concept’ (of justice,
in his case) means (as the kakÒn-concept in Plotinus does) a fundamen-
tal understanding (of the problem), whereas ‘conceptions’ (not unlike the
Plotinian kakã) are singular implementations and applications of this
understanding from case to case. It is wrong to rashly imply, however,
that the kakÒn, aÈtÚ kakÒn or pr«ton kakÒn addressed here must be the
ominous ‘matter itself’ construction. Rather, I should like to maintain, it
is a unique (so to speak) and typically conditioning pattern (hence the
aÈtÒ and the pr«ton, which both are used ‘Platonically’ in order to
express this factor of being a conditioning ‘type’) of a failed coming
together of soul and matter which Plotinus refers to here. At the same
time, he insists on the fact that when he calls this kakÒn matter, he does
so by referring to the processual contrariety becoming manifest between
matter and good within the aurea catena of being, and by an under-
standing coming from the ‘agent-relative’ view on the eternal dynamics
of the ontological katãbasiw and énãbasiw (Enn. I.8[51].13,12-16). In
Enn. II.4[12], too, the account of matter as mØ ˆn depends on the onto-
logical procession and its qualifyability in ‘ups’ and ‘downs’: on matter’s
‘distance’ from the First, its complete ‘otherness’ from being, etc. It
should be evident by now why this is Plotinus’s method in talking about
evil and matter and what they have to do with each other: matter cannot
be grasped as ‘in itself’ or ‘as such’; but énaba¤nvn and kataba¤nvn,
soul gets into contact with matter, experiencing it as pure potentiality and
occasionally as evil.
6. A bold summary
A brief synopsis of what has been said on matter and evil in Plotinus can
be given, I am confident, in some sort of short ‘catechism’ of seven little
steps. With these seven steps, I hardly pretend to do more than to give an
exegesis of what Plotinus summarises in Enn. I.8[51].14,38-55:
[1] Matter, in Plotinus’s view of the prÒodow, is necessary and necessar-
ily structureless, a void hypokeimenon, and strictly êpoiow.
[2] How can matter thus conceived (êpoiow oÔsa) be evil?
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44 I agree with Christoph Horn, Plotin über Sein, Zahl und Einheit (Stuttgart/Leipzig
1995), p. 172, that this is the sort of ‘passive’ érxÆ Plotinus speaks of in Enn. I.8[51].6,31-
44 when qualifying matter: he does so by referring to soul’s view on matter and to
the effect this viewing of matter has on the soul.
45 Cf., as buttressing examples, Plotinus’s repeated but unelaborated talk of how the
soul ‘falls’ down or ‘comes into bodies’ etc. (all of which describes an experience of
an agent) when ‘in reality’ he insists that it is not soul that is embodied, but that it is
rather bodies that are ‘enclosed’ by the soul as a flue is by water (Enn. IV.3[27].9,34ff;
a motif recurring in Enn. VI.9[9].3,3ff; VI.4[22].1,7; V.5[32].9,30).
46 As Christine Korsgaard says (The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge 1996, 
p. 138): “To talk about values and meanings is not to talk about entities [. . .], but to
[3] Plotinus’s answer is: though completely passive, matter ‘stimulates’
the soul to act upon it,44 but since matter is completely structureless,
individual soul’s Sisyphean action upon it, from case to case (and, in
effect, in most cases), is painfully in vain, which is how evil(s) come
into the universe, as shown. The kakÒn at the root of the kakã is to
be found in the inadequate or miscarried relation of soul’s formative
agency on inert matter, not in soul or matter ‘per se’. 
[4] So why does Plotinus call matter evil at all? 
[5] He does so by expressing an enallagé of thoughts in agreement with
his ‘agent-relative’ way of ‘doing philosophy’. Metonymical expres-
sions are an almost typical stylistic feature in Plotinus and denote the
perspective of the philosophical ‘agent’ speaking. Cf. Plotinus’s repeated
references to forms ordering and shaping matter when ‘in reality’ (which
he discloses in just one remote passage and cryptically enough, as he
obviously cannot state it directly) he thinks that forms never do order
matter, but that souls (as relative agents) ‘dream forms towards mat-
ter’, matter remaining without forms and forms remaining within 
the soul’s realm just as our daydreams remain within our minds and
do not shape clouds whatsoever.45 As Plotinus explains in Enn.
VI.7[38].28,7ff, the prior perspective, now rectified by allusion to how
things really behave, was presented as if we made an unreal assump-
tion (ÍpÒyesiw) in order to shortcut the demonstration. I should claim
that talking about matter as if it were something ‘in itself’ and about
matter as evil are such ‘agent-neutral’ shorthand ways of talking as
well. Plotinus states this, in fact, in Enn. I.8[51].5,11-13: “when we
say it ‘is’, we are just using the same word for two different things,
and the true way of speaking is to say it ‘is not’”. – oÈx …w to›w rÉ h-
masi l°getai oÏtv ka‹ tÚ élhy¢w ¶xein, Plato’s Phaedo (102b)
reminds us about our references to relations.46
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talk in a shorthand way about relations we have with ourselves and one another. The
normative demands of meaning and reason are not demands that are made on us by
objects, but are demands that we make on ourselves and each other.” In an analogous
way, one might say about Plotinus’s account of evil: to talk about evil is not to talk
about an entity, but to talk in a shorthand way about relations within the Plotinian
procession and between soul and matter. Evil as the érxh of evils is not an object,
but an outcome of such miscarried relations.
47 Strictly speaking, this is utterly impossible considering Plato’s doctrine that there
can be no fid°a or e‰dow of bad things. And that ‘evil itself’, and therefore an entity
(by ‘self-predication’) entirely evil, is impossible in Plotinus’s eyes as well, is clearly
stated for instance in Enn. I.8[51].15,23f: tÚ d¢ kakÚn oÈ mÒnon §st‹ kakÒn. And
Plotinus adds why: diå dÊnamin égayoË ka‹ fÊsin (15,24) – a perfect account of
evil as depending on the ontological procession in the concluding lines of the treatise
on evils and whence they come.
48 This is perfectly consistent with Plotinus’s observation that “if evil occurs acci-
dentally in something else, it must be something itself (ti aÈtÒ) first, even if it is not
a substance (mØ oÈs¤a)” (Enn. I.8[51].3,22f. And, equally, with his statement in 3,35-
40, where the kakoË oÈs¤a is seriously questioned, but a pr«ton kakÒn and a kayÉ
[6] But can that be maintained in the face of the fact that Plotinus even
calls matter the prime evil or the aÈtÚ kakÒn etc.?
[7] The above interpretation of Enn. I.8[51].13 can serve as a clue: there
must be something underlying to the phenomenal forms of the kakã,
and these should just be taken as different expressions of one subja-
cent pattern or common origin: just as different sorts of unvirtuous
actions are not kak¤a in its all-encompassing form which we might
call the aÈtØ kak¤a; but they all definitely revert to it. Now what is
the ‘type’ (negatively spoken) of all these different occurrences, what
is the one kakÒn at the very bottom of all the different kakã? Well,
firstly: something which as a ‘type’ of multiple occurrences can be
Platonically called a ‘first evil’ or aÈtÚ kakÒn, and which can be seen
as such a thing independently of all accidental determinations and sin-
gular circumstances, i.e., a metaphysical pattern. And secondly: it
does not necessarily have to be something in the sense of some entity
or principle47 or – in the worst of cases – a ‘substance’, and I should
like to argue: not even in the sense of a proto-substantial hypokei-
menon such as matter might be conceived. The kakÒn as presented by
Plotinus can be a – paradigmatic, in a negative and passive way –
state of affairs, a flaw, a misconnection, an ‘event’, etc. as well. And
it is. It is such a flaw and combination defect in the sense explained
in [3], and particular evils are its concrete multiple outcomes.48
Compare it to (and forgive me the sorrowfully German thought to
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aÍtÚ kakÒn is conserved all the same. Finally, in 5,9-13, an ˆntvw kakÒn is denied
and evil’s ‘being’ denounced as a shortcut expression of naming what is not a being.
follow) such obviously recurring events in the course of history that
could make us believe in ‘circular history’, in history repeating itself:
there is no ‘substance’ at the root of all this; just a pattern of all too
human standard relationships (and their failure) that obviously won’t
pass away.
These are only a few and fairly small steps, and they are easily reconcil-
able with Plotinus’s illustrative and elliptical idiom, as well as smoothly
comprehensible within the philosophical ductus of the Enneads. In com-
parison, the gain is enormous.
For whoever wishes to submit a rational reconstruction of Plotinus’s
philosophy must take his philosophical premises and intentions seriously.
This sounds banal. But for Plotinus’s explanation of matter this implies
that one is to follow his basic tenet of the first producing Principle’s com-
plete and utter Goodness, Its sole causation, and Its omnipotence down to
the detail. And this means that the interpreter has to apply this tenet all
the way down to the prÒodow from the One and even to the very last out-
post of this procession, which is matter. To avoid paradoxes (such as Good
producing evil) and inconsistencies (such as a tacit dualism of principles,
one entirely active and good, one totally evil) in the interpretation of Plotinus,
and to avoid, above all and even more calamitous, imputing such para-
doxes and inconsistencies to Plotinus rather than to oneself, a consistent
explication of matter and evil in the Enneads should run like this: the One
produces whatever it produces completely and flawlessly. The generation
of being stemming from it brings forth matter as the last possible offspring
in the ontological procession. Matter, as the hypokeimenon of soul’s activ-
ity, has what no ‘emanate’ or hypokeimenon had so far, i.e., passively and
potentialiter (never in actu or ‘as such’, neither of which ever applies to
matter) the disposition to wake evil in the constellation and manner described
above in its exasperating interaction with soul which experiences it as
completely inert and in no way apt for formation. This is why matter, in
an enallagé of thoughts which turns our attention from a view of matter
‘per se’ to Plotinus’ conception of the problem quoad nos, is called the
kakÒn in the Enneads. Matter thus and in a way as awkward as its own
‘meontic being’ completes the perfect order and scaling of the entire cos-
mos, or at least it does so as long as it remains pure passive dÊnamiw not
in contact with soul. Only when soul comes upon it in a certain wrong
way which does not have to be wrong but can be wrong, evils come into
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49 Plotinus states this in Enn. I.8[51].7,16ff, a passage which also deserves atten-
tion insofar as it touches on the problem of Plato’s ‘necessity’-formula in Theaetetus
176a. Note again how ‘evil’ is inserted in the ‘processual philosophy’ and matter,
again, is what is most distant from the Good (substitute ‘First’ for ‘actuality’, ‘Last’
for ‘potentiality’ in Armstrong’s translation, and the case will become clearer). The
consequence (ka‹ aÏth ktl.) will be that matter (qua mere potentiality) will be nec-
essary for the prÒodow to come to an end, and this is where evil comes in as well,
since evil, though not simply the same as matter, will not come about without matter.
Though Plotinus does not say here, in what manner: “One can grasp the necessity of
evil in this way too. Since not only the Good exists, there must be the last end to the
process of going out past it [. . .]: and this last, after which nothing else can come into
being, is evil. Now it is necessary that what comes after the First should exist, and
therefore that the Last should exists; and this is matter, which possesses nothing at all
of the Good. And in this way too evil is necessary”. Evil here is clearly the outcome
of a process. Again, it is not an instance per se, but the result of a miscarried rela-
tion at the lowest seam of reality. 
50 Tragische Schuld im Theatrum Mundi Plotins, and in Unde Malum, pp. 69-104
(cf. above footnote 21).
51 As a matter of fact, it will take much more than that to compel consent to this
interpretation. There are some notoriously difficult passages in the Enneads, which
the world: there was no need for them to come about. But, Íp¢r mÒron,
it happened.49
As it is easy to see, the problem in this paper was strictly narrowed
down to the question of matter and evil; for that limited scope, what I
said should suffice. However, it should have become clear that a second
constituent is lacking for a thorough explanation of evil and its coming
about. That second constituent is, of course, soul’s role in the drama of
evil, and an interpretation of what it means that the soul ‘sins’ and ‘falls’
etc. I have treated this problem(s) at length elsewhere50 and I hope to have
coupled my answer(s) to the question of ‘evil’ matter in such a way as to
render the whole a compact and consistent exegesis of Plotinus’s view on
evil altogether. For now, I should just like to point out that the fact that
my interpretation of matter in Plotinus’s normative ontology cannot stand
alone but needs a complementary view on the coherence of his philo-
sophical system, makes a strong point in favour of its accuracy, and, if I
may be so bold, of its ‘Plotinian spirit’.
7. Some possible consequences
No doubt, this interpretation of matter’s ‘status’ and ‘normative assess-
ment’ in Plotinus’s ontology takes getting used to.51 As a methodologically
advisable lectio difficilior of Plotinus’s own wording and as a correction
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crave a more detailed analysis of the problem than I am able to give here. I am
presently working on some of them in order to offer a thorough interpretation in
another publication yet to appear. These are the already mentioned Enn. I.8[51].7 and
13, III.6[23].7, and VI.7[38].28. For now, I can only refer the reader once again to
some pertinent remarks in my Unde Malum, pp. 112ff; 141-47; 156-167.
52 It is because they turned away from God and ‘upper’ reality and toward the vast
unbounded, but never ‘real’, prospective of their own possibilities that (Pseudo-)
Dionysius, in his treatise On the Divine Names, calls the devil’s and daemons’ fall
and form of existence prÒsulow, ‘toward matter’: DN 725 A. Supposedly emulating
(if not copying) Proclus, the alleged slasher of Plotinus’s ‘doctrine’ on evil, Dionysius
as a Christian thinker expresses exactly the same view on matter and evil Plotinus
proposes. For this statement in Dionysius, too, and for the last time now, I defer a
necessary discussion of the problem to my Unde Malum, pp. 440-452.
of ingrained views on Plotinus, it takes on the standard reading of – above
all – Enn. I.8[51]. It is an attempt to interpret the problem according to
the ‘spurious reasoning’ or indeed very ‘diverse kind of reasoning’ etc.
Plotinus himself holds to be necessary here (cf. Enn. II.4[12].10,8; 10,10ff;
and 12,32f – a reference to Plato’s Timaeus 52 b), taking seriously, at the
same time, the metaphysical images and illustrative allusions and hints
Plotinus to which Plotinus has recourse.
On the other hand, this interpretation would also allow recognition of
Plotinus’s ‘doctrine’ of evil as the pattern underlying all (or at least most)
subsequent Neoplatonic explanations of the unde-malum problem, includ-
ing those of the Christian Neoplatonists who, like Augustine, Boethius,
(Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite, and even Anselm of Canterbury, could
not consent to a thesis identifying matter with evil (since the ‘fall of the
angels’ has nothing to do with matter), but propose a doctrine of the nar-
cissistic aversio a Deo towards much lesser and ontologically poorer
degrees of reality, however, ‘richer’ as to potentiality (that is the sinful
error in normative estimation) by spiritual, or at least rational, creatures
gifted with freedom.52
Even more heretical, I would propose that my interpretation can – at
least to a notable extent – reconcile Plotinus’s view of the problem with
Proclus’s, whose treatise De malorum subsistentia is traditionally held to
be in contention with the ‘Plotinian’ doctrine of evil identified with mat-
ter. I am quite sure that it is in contention with that doctrine, but not with
Plotinus.
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